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ASYMMETRIES AND INCENTIVES IN EVIDENCE 
PRODUCTION 
Saul Levmore and Ariel Porat* 
 
Legal rules severely restrict payments to fact witnesses, though the 
government can often offer plea bargains or other nonmonetary 
inducements to encourage testimony. This asymmetry is something of 
a puzzle, for most asymmetries in criminal law favor the defendant. 
The asymmetry seems to disappear where physical evidence is at 
issue, though most such evidence can be compelled and need not be 
purchased. Another asymmetry concerns advance payment for likely 
witnesses, as opposed to monetary inducements once the content of 
the required testimony is known. One goal of this Article is to 
understand the various asymmetries—monetary/nonmonetary, 
prosecution/defense, ex ante/ex post, and testimonial/physical—and 
another is to suggest ways in which law could better encourage the 
production of evidence, and thus the efficient reduction of crime, 
with a relaxation of the rule barring payment. 
 
* Saul Levmore is the William B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor, 
University of Chicago Law School. Ariel Porat is the Alain Poher Professor of 
Law, Tel Aviv University, and Fischel-Neil Distinguished Visiting Professor of 
Law, University of Chicago Law School. We thank David Pi for excellent research 
assistance as well as Richard McAdams and participants at workshops at the 
University of Toronto and University of Chicago for stimulating questions and 
discussion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The law of evidence is full of puzzles. Many of these revolve 
around admissibility and, more narrowly, the rules forbidding or 
restricting payment to a fact witness.1 Presumably, the dangers of 
self-interest and perjury are thought to dominate the benefits 
normally associated with remuneration for hard work. At the same 
time, the government—but not the defense—is able to reward 
witnesses in criminal cases with certain nonmonetary inducements, 
including agreements to seek reduced penalties, or even not to 
prosecute at all in both related and unrelated cases. If a witness is 
already incarcerated, the government can offer to improve the 
conditions of confinement.2 This asymmetry is something of a 
 
1 See ABA Rules of Professional Conduct 3.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . . falsify 
evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a 
witness that is prohibited by law.”). The “comments” section of Rule 3.4(b) states: 
“[I]t is not improper to pay a witness’s expenses or to compensate an expert 
witness on terms permitted by law. The common law rule in most jurisdictions is 
that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying and that it is 
improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.”  
2 See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and 
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2000) (“According to U.S. Sentencing Commission 
studies, one of every five federal defendants receives a sentencing reduction for 
‘substantial assistance’ to the government, which is just one form of compensation 
that prosecutors can offer to cooperating witnesses. Many more seek such 
reductions. As observed by one Assistant United States Attorney, “[i]t is a rare 
federal case that does not require the use of criminal witnesses—those who have 
pleaded guilty to an offense and are testifying under a plea agreement, or those 
 ASYMMETRIES AND INCENTIVES IN EVIDENCE PRODUCTION 3 
puzzle, for most asymmetries in criminal law favor the defendant. 
The asymmetry seems to disappear where physical evidence is at 
issue. Both prosecutors and defendants, and even potential 
defendants, can within limits encourage the production of physical 
evidence with monetary rewards, though of course pieces of 
evidence (like testimony) can also be judicially compelled and thus 
need not be purchased.3 The ability of even interested defendants to 
pay for physical evidence is sensible rather than doubly puzzling if 
one regards the dangers of bias and false testimony as much reduced 
in the case of physical evidence. At the same time, this 
permissiveness with respect to one kind of evidence raises the 
question of why we do not see more payments (or requests for 
payment) for things like privately owned surveillance devices that 
could generate important evidence.  
One goal of this Article is to develop the idea that a better 
understanding of the particular distaste for monetary incentives and 
also of the asymmetry in favor of the government leads to a 
conclusion that law could better encourage the production of 
evidence. Law’s focus has been on the rules of evidence-gathering in 
the investigation of crimes and accusations. We suggest that optimal 
crime fighting, as well as individual rights’ preservation, likely 
involves greater private investment in strategies that are set in motion 
before specific crimes are committed. Our positive theorizing about 
several asymmetries regarding inducements to produce evidence—
monetary/nonmonetary, prosecution/defense, testimonial/physical—
has a payoff for the normative question of how to encourage the 
production of evidence and thus the accuracy of verdicts and the 
efficient reduction of crime.4 In the process, we offer a number of 
explanations for the existing and superficially troubling 
asymmetries.5 
 
who are testifying under a grant of immunity.”) (citing Ian Weinstein, Regulating 
the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 564, 580 n.58 (1999); also citing, 
Mary Wisniewski Holden, Questions Remain After 10 Years of Sentencing 
Guidelines, CHI. LAW., Dec 1997; and Ann C. Rowland, Effective Use of 
Informants and Accomplice Witnesses, 50 S. C. L. REV. 679, 697 (1999)). 
3 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.  
4 We do not pretend to know the correct tradeoff between hiring more police and 
installing surveillance cameras, for example, but our strategy is to better 
understand the hurdles to better evidence gathering embedded in current law, and 
then to suggest some changes or investments that are likely to improve the 
efficiency of evidence gathering and production. 
5 Eugene Kontorovich & Ezra Friedman, An Economic Analysis of Fact Witness 
Payment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 139 (2011), highlights the monopoly power of fact 
witnesses and argues for regulated payments rather than zero payments under a 
kind of liability rule. We reach a different conclusion, and we point to new 
problems associated with payments to witnesses. We also explore the 
asymmetrical bargaining power of the prosecution and defendant in criminal cases, 
the choice between early and late payments to witnesses, and the possibility of 
unregulated (market) payments for testimony and physical evidence. 
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Part I analyzes the first two asymmetries. Part II begins with the 
apparent distinction between a payment made before particular 
testimony is sought and that made ex post, when it is known to 
concern a particular accused or to favor one side in a specific 
criminal case. This distinction turns out to play an important role in 
understanding where monetary payment is permitted. The analysis 
then incorporates physical evidence, and thus the third asymmetry, 
and develops the idea that the law of takings, as well as that of 
salvage, can partly inform the law of evidence. We make the case for 
greater investment in the production of evidence, and especially for 
advance payments for physical evidence. The Article concludes with 
a summary of policy implications and limitations. 
  
I. LIMITS ON INDUCEMENTS TO TESTIFY 
A. The Ban on Payment for Testimony 
Criminal laws pertaining to bribery and to the rules of evidence 
and of professional responsibility combine to limit payments to 
witnesses.6 At one end of the spectrum, expert witnesses can be paid 
for their time, and in this manner earn a return on their training.7 
Even run-of-the mill fact witnesses can generally be compensated for 
time and travel.8 But at the other end, no payment can be conditioned 
 
6 See ABA Rules of Professional Conduct 3.4(b). cited supra note 1; see also, 18 
U.S.C. §201 (the federal bribery statute); and Jeffrey S. Kinsler & Gary S. Colton, 
Jr., Compensating Fact Witnesses, 184 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS 425 (1999) 
(discussing the permissible level of payment to witnesses for their time and travel 
expenses); and Harris, supra note 2, at 5-13 (2000) (describing the “ethical rules 
and criminal sanctions regarding compensation to witnesses”). 
7 See Harris, supra note 2, at 34-46 (describing the history and practice of 
compensating expert witnesses).  
8 Many states are guided by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
establishes that “it is not improper to pay a witness’s expenses or to compensate an 
expert witness on terms permitted by law.” See Rule 3.4(b) of ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct. The “terms permitted by law” are in turn guided by the 
federal bribery law, which states that the prohibitions on paying witnesses “shall 
not be construed to prohibit the payment or receipt of witness fees provided by 
law, or the payment, by the party upon whose behalf a witness is called and receipt 
by a witness, of the reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred and the 
reasonable value of time lost in attendance at any such trial, hearing, or 
proceeding, or in the case of expert witnesses, a reasonable fee for time spent in 
the preparation of such opinion, and in appearing and testifying.” See 18 U.S.C. 
201(d); see also, John K. Villa, Paying Fact Witnesses, ACCA DOCKET, October 
2001, at 112 (“Although the common law rule survives in some jurisdictions, most 
states have now modified the rule to permit fact witnesses to be reimbursed for 
expenses incurred and compensated for time lost with respect to litigation.”), citing 
Centennial Management Services, Inc. v. AXA Re Vie, 193 F.R.D. 671 (D. Kan. 
2000); also citing New York v. Solvent Chemical Co., 166 F.R.D. 284 (W.D.N.Y. 
1996); and Kinsler & Colton, supra note 6, at 427-428). 
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on “the giving of testimony in a certain way,” none can be made to 
prevent or discourage a witness from testifying, and none can be 
contingent on the outcome of the case.9  
One can imagine a legal system’s permitting payments in order 
to encourage fact witnesses, especially if they have reason to be 
afraid, or where the truth to which one testifies is unpopular. But it is 
plain that most legal systems, and certainly relevant U.S. law, reflect 
the view that profit will dangerously generate falsehoods.10 The 
nearly universal strategy is to permit both sides to enlist the help of a 
court in order to compel witnesses to testify, but not to use money or 
similar compensation to encourage unidentifiable witnesses to step 
forward, to encourage reluctant witnesses to be more forthcoming, or 
to encourage the production of physical evidence that would not 
otherwise come into being. 
One source of exception might be the convention, or sporadic 
practice, of offering a reward for information leading to the arrest of 
a perpetrator, or for information leading to the return of a stolen item. 
In the process of collecting the reward, a potential witness might be 
identified and in this way, even if eventually compelled to testify, 
effectively paid for testimony. At a minimum, rewards for 
information rather than testimony could be challenged at trial as part 
of an objection to the admissibility of evidence, including a prior 
approval of an intrusive search. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising 
that these rewards do not appear to have generated litigation when 
the information encouraged in this manner had an impact on actual 
testimony.  
The information-testimony connection is not entirely 
overlooked. A lawyer in search of an alibi witness would probably 
not dare post the advertisement: “I will pay $1,000 for a witness who 
 
9 See Villa, supra note 8, at 112, 113 (“Any condition attached to the payments that 
may be viewed as influencing the testimony of the witness is suspect. For example, 
in a case in which payment is (1) conditioned on the giving of testimony in a 
certain way, even if conditioned on ‘truthful testimony,’ (2) is made to prevent the 
witness's attendance at trial, or (3) is contingent to any extent on the outcome of 
the case, the payment will be deemed unethical.”) (citations omitted).  
 The claim that no payment can be conditioned on “the giving of testimony in a 
certain way” is somewhat exaggerated. There are situations in which a plea bargain 
or other nonmonetary promise is withdrawn because a witness has misled the 
prosecution or reversed course about his or her intention to testify. To some 
degree, the witness who has bargained must keep one end of the bargain in order to 
enjoy the other...Alternatively, the statement in the text can be understood as 
limited to monetary payments; this version underreports the interesting fact that 
even nonmonetary inducements may not be offered either in return for a promise 
not to testify or in a manner that depends entirely on the outcome of a criminal 
trial. 
10 A more cynical theory is that the legal system is designed to reduce costs, and to 
capitalize on the power to compel witnesses and physical evidence without 
compensation. See discussion infra section I.B.1. 
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saw the person pictured below in East Los Angeles on Friday, the 3rd 
of March.” But, of course, lawyers and investigators regularly grease 
information pathways, so that there are some payments that lead to 
testimony. Moreover, the hypothetical advertisement just sketched 
would be conventional rather than daring if it avoided the word 
witness and simply asked for information about its featured subject. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain systematic information about 
related practices. Attorneys report that information from many 
sources is evaluated by both sides and sometimes offered by the 
defense to the police in order to change the course of an 
investigation. But it seems safe to proceed under the assumption that 
the world of criminal trials would look different if payments for 
testimony were explicitly permitted. As we will see, both sides might 
offer payments ex post, and the government (and perhaps insurers) 
would likely offer payments ex ante in order to increase the 
production of evidence. Under current law, however, only some 
indirect payments to fact witnesses are permitted. Each side can offer 
these ex ante rewards for information, but only the government can 
induce a witness with a promise to reduce criminal charges or to 
improve the terms of confinement.11  
Another source of exceptions to the doctrinal claim that neither 
party may directly influence fact witnesses with monetary payments, 
is the availability of rewards to whistleblowers, whether because of 
public law or private law, which is to say statutes or promises. The 
private promises might arise out of corporate governance and ethics 
initiatives—though in fact these systems rarely offer rewards. 
Whistleblowers who respond to promised rewards can receive flat 
payments or calibrated commissions, and there is obviously some 
danger of false claims. Moreover, inasmuch as there is rarely, if ever, 
a promise of matching compensation for contrary information, the 
arrangements are structurally asymmetrical. When the reward is 
authorized by statute, there is no legal problem—short of a 
 
11 Plea bargains are not quite universal, but it is noteworthy that even civil law 
jurisdictions, like France and Germany, have come to embrace them, though with a 
requirement that the judge be firmly in control of the process. See Maike 
Frommann, Regulating Plea Bargaining in Germany: Can the Italian Approach 
Serve as a Model to Guarantee the Independence of German Judges?, 5 HANSE L. 
REV. 197 (2009). In some countries, plea arrangements are limited to reductions in 
time served, so that once the prosecutor brings charges, they cannot be withdrawn. 
Of course, this might simply accelerate the timetable for bargaining because it is 
hard to force the prosecutor to bring charges in the first place. 
Note that the government can also offer a kind of ex ante plea bargain, in the form 
of immunity from prosecution. Again, that is something only the government is 
empowered to wield. Similarly, the government can encourage witnesses by 
promising not to deport—or even to help in the quest for legal status and then 
citizenship—illegal immigrants who step forward to testify. See 
http://www.usimmigrationsupport.org/visa-u.html (explaining U visa and 
requirement of certification by a law enforcement authority). 
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constitutional objection—though the asymmetry can be instructive. 
Within broad constitutional limits, the government is simply 
permitted to set the rules of the game. For example, Section 7623 of 
the U.S. Internal Revenue Code rewards “specific and credible” 
information that substantially leads to the collection of more than $2 
million of tax. The whistleblower receives between 15% and 30% of 
the amount the Internal Revenue Service collects. There is, of course, 
no corresponding reward for witnesses who help a taxpayer defeat a 
claim by the government and, presumably, no taxpayer could pay a 
witness in this manner without violating the norm and rule against 
paying for testimony.12 In most cases, the rewarded informant will 
not need to testify, because the information will have generated an 
audit and the government can proceed on its own, but even where 
testimony is eventually sought from, or actually compelled of, the 
informant, the statutory authority overcomes the more general 
doctrinal objection to paid testimony. 
More generally, legislation can specifically authorize rewards 
for direct testimony and information, and most posted rewards are 
indeed protected by statutes. As already intimated, a court might 
break new ground and rule that such payment, perhaps because of its 
asymmetric nature, was a violation of the defendant’s due process 
right, or somehow amounted to a miscarriage of justice. Absent more 
specific evidence of bias or fraudulent testimony, the defendant 
might as well argue that it was unfair or unconstitutional that the 
police who arrested him worked for the government, while he had no 
subsidized investigators of his own. Of course, that “claim” is further 
weakened by the argument that the police do in fact look for 
evidence of innocence as well as guilt, and that the government is 
indeed asymmetrically obliged to turn over evidence that might 
exculpate a defendant. One asymmetry might offset the other, though 
we hesitate to deploy such arguments especially where the starting 
point involves an asymmetrical burden of proof.13 Still, the offset is 
incomplete or metaphorical; the government is not in the habit of 
promising rewards for information leading to the exoneration of a 
suspected wrongdoer. There are, however, private-sector 
whistleblower plans that are not directly authorized by statute. When 
these schemes guaranty confidentiality, an investigator who follows 
up on information provided by a whistleblower must develop 
 
12 For some discussion of the idea that the government’s reward simply offsets the 
implicit reward available, say, to the defendant’s loyal employee, see infra text 
accompanying notes 28-29. 
13 Thus, plea bargaining for testimony might be acceptable because it offsets a 
witness’s ability to invoke the right against self-incrimination. Our intuition is that 
such a witness is as likely to help the defense as the prosecution, but the larger 
point is that there is no shortage of asymmetries about. Our strategy is identify 
some that seem puzzling in order to reveal underlying themes and incentives.  
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evidence without the direct participation of the original informant. If 
there is an asymmetry here, it is brought about by the fact that only 
one “side” will have funded the infrastructure that supports the 
reporting system. 
Even where whistleblowing systems do offer rewards and lead 
to voluntary or compelled testimony, a lawyer could surely argue 
that there was no direct payment for testimony. In any event, our 
purpose here is not to argue that whistleblowing rewards ought to be 
exposed and quashed. They surely ought to be transparent, in the 
sense that a a criminal defendant is entitled to know that information 
used against him might have been encouraged by the promise of 
reward, because that might give the defense some clue as to where to 
look for evidence of perjury, for the foundation of a claim that the 
government deployed an unconstitutional warrant, or simply for the 
basis of an argument to a jury that some information it heard may be 
unreliable.14  
A notable feature of all these arrangements—private or public, 
episodic or standing (which is to say occasionally posted rewards as 
opposed to longstanding whistleblower arrangements), and even 
authorized or spontaneous—is that the more the monetary 
encouragement is provided ex ante, well before it is clear whether 
testimony at trial will be sought, the more it seems to be legally 
accepted. It is not immediately obvious why this should be so; 
paying for someone to come forward and provide information 
regarding tax fraud does not present different hazards from those 
associated with paying someone who is already identified as having 
information about a particular defendant. The distinction, or rationale 
for different legal treatment, might simply be that the more the 
witness is identifiable, the more he or she can be compelled, so that 
there is less need for payment. Moreover, late-in-time bargains with 
identifiable witnesses will often be vulnerable to the holdout power 
of these witnesses.15 In contrast, earlier and broader offers create a 
kind of competitive market for testimony, where holdouts are less 
likely. These observations about the advantages of ex ante offers16 
may well explain the incentives and asymmetries associated with the 
production and subsequent gathering of evidence, and it is something 
 
14 It is possible that a defendant never discovers the details of the whistleblowing. 
But law may be less concerned where A gives information leading investigators to 
talk to B or to audit B than where A directly informs on B. A may have his own 
motives, but where there is an independent source for the evidence, less attention is 
likely paid to the role motives play in discovering that source.  
15 This monopoly power figures importantly in Kontorovich & Friedman, supra 
note 5, as it does below. 
16 Note that by ex ante we refer to offers made before a crime occurs. The offer 
could be for all material of a certain kind or for testimony in the event of a crime. 
The payment need not be made before, or independent of, the commission of a 
crime.  
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to which we return. 
  
B. Monetary versus Nonmonetary Inducements 
1. The Holdout Problem and other Dangers 
It is plain that the ban on payments, or perhaps ex post 
payments, but not on plea bargains with witnesses, requires more of 
a defense. This is especially so because even though the defendant 
also enjoys the court’s power to compel testimony and evidence, that 
capacity is not a perfect substitute for the ability to pay. One can 
compel witnesses known to have relevant information, while the 
promise of payment might go much further; it might encourage 
persons otherwise unknown, and also encourage the production of 
evidence currently not produced. It is possible that some of these 
unknown witnesses could be encouraged by a legal rule that created 
an affirmative obligation to come forward with information—and 
also penalized persons who failed to comply. But even this rule 
would miss witnesses who did not know they had information 
relevant to a given trial (while well-advertised rewards might find 
such witnesses) and, in any event, no modern legal system appears to 
impose this sort of duty to rescue in systematic fashion. The 
discussion in Part II below focuses on just such a pool of 
information, distinguished by the fact that it is accessible by persons 
who might not on their own take control of the relevant information 
and whom the state does not know to compel.  
A different perspective on the ban on payments focuses not on 
what might be compelled but rather on the dangers associated with 
payments. One danger is the loss of civic virtue; the ban on direct 
monetary inducements has a great deal in common with the ban on 
organ sales and military duties. On the other hand, inasmuch as 
rewards and other ex ante payment are permitted, the explanation is a 
limited one. Another danger is that money will induce false 
testimony, so that it must be allowed only in exceptional 
circumstances.  Thus, experts may be compensated at reasonable, 
discoverable, professional rates because it is apparent that if 
payments were forbidden there would be few professionals of the 
kind often needed. Of course, the more confidence we have in the 
law of perjury, the more it might be sensible to pay even nonexperts 
in order to encourage reluctant witnesses or those who can invest in 
the production of evidence. In between is the compromise position, 
or question, of why law does not permit payments so long as they are 
fully disclosed to adversaries and to the court. The expert’s fee is, for 
example, fully discoverable, and either side can suggest or warn that 
the fee paid to the other side’s expert makes that witness’s opinion 
10 122 YALE LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming 2012)  
 
less reliable or unbiased. Thus, a well-compensated psychiatrist who 
had interviewed fifty defendants and testified at their respective trials 
that they were all insane would find that this testimonial history was 
admissible as evidence and, then, that the present testimony was 
perceived as less reliable than it would be if coming from one who 
often declined to support an insanity defense.  
The fear that payments to witnesses would encourage false 
testimony, undeterred by perjury charges, is exacerbated by the 
likelihood that unregulated payments would often be substantial. At 
the same time, a requirement that payments to witnesses be fully 
disclosed is only effective if undisclosed payments, as well as false 
testimony, are easily exposed.17 An acquittal is of great value to a 
defendant, and sometimes a substantial cost to the prosecutor, so that 
payments for testimony might be expected to be quite high and to 
invite falsehoods.18 On the other hand, a jury might be quick to doubt 
nonexperts who were highly compensated and, presumably, a high 
fee will also signal an adversary to invest more in an attempt to 
impeach the witness.  
The problems with monetary inducements for testimony are not 
limited to veracity. Even a truthful fact witness would frequently 
enjoy monopoly power and could command a high fee in a free 
market, where there is no compulsion, because the witness might 
know that no one else observed an event or could provide an alibi for 
the defendant.19 In contrast, there is normally a modest upper bound 
on what an expert witness can command because other experts can 
be brought in to do such things as interview defendants and compare 
laboratory samples. In this respect, the expert is like the witness who 
is encouraged ex ante, when there is still a competitive market, and is 
bound to testify in the event that he witnesses an event at a price that 
was determined beforehand. The legal system, as well as the parties 
in a given trial, would be ill-served if witnesses were allowed to 
 
17 The discussion proceeds on the assumption that perjury would be prosecuted and 
that an exception to the double jeopardy protection would apply, as it does in many 
jurisdictions, where perjury was found to have brought about a mistaken acquittal. 
 Note that disclosure is promising only if juries can be counted on to discount 
testimony in appropriate fashion, depending on the incentives received by 
witnesses. Cognitive biases come into play here, especially because jurors will 
have little experience in these matters.  
18 With or without disclosure, there is also the moral hazard that crimes will be 
encouraged or even undertaken by those who hope to prosper as witnesses. 
19 When the witness is the sole source of information, the analysis can unravel 
because an opportunistic “witness” might not bother to encourage a crime but 
might simply aver that one did or did not occur in order to get payment from a 
defendant (or prosecutor). Inasmuch as such a wrongdoer must fear exposure, we 
prefer to dwell on witnesses who might exaggerate or be biased when substantial 
compensation is available, but who will not manufacture events out of whole cloth. 
One who only exaggerates or selectively recalls events is less likely to be exposed 
as a perjurer.  
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extract the monopoly value of their testimony.20  
One antidote to holdouts and monopolists is to compel transfers. 
We can think of testimony as compelled much as citizens are drafted 
to serve in the armed forces or as property can be taken for the public 
good. And the ban on payments to the monopolist is, perhaps, similar 
to the fact that a brilliant general or successful politician cannot 
normally bargain for an extraordinary salary, though of course that 
provider’s services cannot be compelled. None of these analogies is 
perfect. The government can choose to pay a great deal to acquire 
private property, and it can pay high compensation to the very 
individuals whose services it cannot compel (like doctors or 
professors in its hospitals and universities). The property analogy is 
perhaps the more useful one because the rule that just compensation 
need only incorporate pre-takings value avoids the windfalls and 
holdouts that are similarly avoided by the government’s ability to 
compel fact witnesses. Moreover, because the witness knows that the 
government cannot choose to pay for testimony, there is no point in 
holding out. The witnesses cannot extract the high value of 
information for a given trial but is rather limited to something like 
the value of the witness’s time in a pre-accusation world. This 
takings perspective is useful, and developed further in the next Part, 
but it should not obscure the reality that neither side can subpoena or 
otherwise compel a witness unless it knows of the witness’s 
existence and, perhaps, of the information the witness possesses. 
When they do not know whom to compel, it is plausible that a 
significant reward—though likely less than the monopolist’s price—
will often be necessary to produce the information.  
The preceding analysis omitted the government’s ability to plea 
bargain, as well as to change the terms or length of confinement 
applicable to a cooperative witness, and thus pay for testimony with 
nonmonetary means. Once these inducements are included, it is 
apparent that the law of evidence cannot possibly be described as 
designed to deny monopoly power. Some witnesses are obviously 
able to hold out for monopoly payments, in the form of reduced 
prison sentences or criminal charges. The inconvenient point is that 
the government might offer a generous bargain to a valued witness, 
even exacting no punishment for a past crime and relocating the 
witness, in order to gain testimony that helps to convict another, 
perhaps more dangerous, criminal. When induced in this manner, the 
witness receives something of much greater value than the pre-
accusation value of his or her time. There is not only an asymmetry 
 
20 See Kontorovich & Friedman, supra note 5 (arguing that the monopoly power of 
the fact witness, as opposed to expert witnesses, may justify our system, which 
grants property rule protection of expert testimony but compels fact witnesses to 
testify). 
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as to the parties’ ability to pay for testimony, because the 
government can use nonmonetary incentives, but also there is the 
likelihood of a windfall to the witness. These nonmonetary payments 
raise the risk of bias and perjury, and are puzzling. If the risk is great, 
then plea bargains for testimony ought to be disallowed; if the risk is 
controlled, then defendants ought to be able to make nonmonetary or 
monetary payments as a countermeasure.21  
2. Holdouts and Ex Ante Payments 
A nice explanation for the ban on some payments begins with 
the recognition of the fact that both sides can pay employees who 
might in the matter of course take to the witness stand. Police 
officers are paid by the state, though presumably not for testimony to 
be given “in a certain way,” and some defendants’ employees might 
end up testifying in ways that benefit their employers. Some of these 
employees might not be hired, or might receive lower salaries, if they 
could bargain for extra payments when it became clear that their 
testimony was valuable. Law might, therefore, bar payments in order 
to prevent any de facto renegotiation of the original employment 
contracts. A watchman has no monopoly or holdout power when 
hired, but once he has information about a crime he will know that he 
possesses such power and can try to hold out for additional payment 
by conveniently suffering from some memory lapse. The law might 
overcome this holdout power, to the long-run benefit of potential 
watchmen as a group, by decreeing that ex post payments are 
unenforceable or that testimony fueled by such payments is 
inadmissible.22 In short, the rule against direct (ex post) payments 
preserves, or raises the value of, ex ante contracts.  
This holdout problem may not be serious where the government 
seeks testimony because it is a repeat player, able to gain a reputation 
 
21 One can barely imagine a system where plea bargains are used symmetrically. A 
defendant could coax a reluctant witness by offering a reduced prison term or even 
a promise that the witness will not face some charges, subject to approval, ex ante 
or ex post, by the presiding judge. In turn, the judge would be guided by 
instructions to provide incentives comparable to what the government had 
provided other witnesses in the case at hand or, with more complexity, in keeping 
with what the government offered in other criminal cases. The goal would be to 
elicit the truth and balance society’s interests in the present case or in all cases. 
Such a system would also reduce the relative disadvantage of impoverished 
defendants. Indeed, if the rules permitted only nonmonetary inducements, but 
symmetrically so, they would be understood as aiming to correct for wealth 
differentials. 
22 The strategy is familiar in other areas of law. A professional athlete having the 
season of his life may suddenly complain of ailments while trying to renegotiate 
his contract in midseason. In the case of rescue and emergency, law simply refuses 
to enforce bargains that are negotiated under “duress,” but in other areas it is 
difficult to separate opportunistic and “normal” breaches.  
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for refusing to pay where the witness is seeking a windfall.23 We 
might even say that the prosecutor can plea bargain for testimony 
because potential witnesses know that she will not do so in a manner 
that undermines ex ante contracts with persons normally expected to 
witness crimes. This explanation does not overcome the objection 
that the defendant is uncharacteristically disadvantaged by the 
asymmetric rule. There is, however, another way to deal with the 
holdout problem and it is most usefully developed in the context of 
physical rather than testimonial evidence. 
C. Explaining the State’s Asymmetrical Advantage  
How should we best understand this asymmetry with respect to 
nonmonetary inducements? There is always the simple possibility 
that the government is asymmetrically favored in the law of evidence 
because voters, legislators, and even courts share the majority’s 
preference for fighting crime as well as its disinclination to protect 
criminal defendants. Constitutional constraints battle this preference 
at many junctures—most especially with the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard—but where such law is less vigilant, it is the 
majority’s preferences that are reflected in law, crafted in 
incremental fashion by judges and legislators not inclined to enhance 
the protection of the unpopular minority.  
A second, more mundane version of this understanding builds 
on the majority’s disinclination to tax itself. Plea bargaining 
generates benefits for the majority by “taxing” unidentifiable 
interests and persons who are unlikely to organize and, in any event, 
unlikely to argue against this method of inducing witnesses. At the 
same time it keeps taxes low. Put plainly, the majority might like 
asymmetry in favor of its government and stacked against criminal 
suspects, and it pushes this preference as far as constitutional law 
allows. It is arguable that while constitutional law (in the United 
States and comparable protections elsewhere) permits the majority to 
use plea bargains, it would probably not allow the more blatant 
asymmetry of permitting the government to pay directly for 
witnesses in criminal trials when the defendant could not do so.24 In 
short, the majority’s perceived self-interest brings about law’s 
forbidding monetary payments to witnesses in order to leave on the 
table only those inducements that the government can 
asymmetrically exploit. Under this view, it is possible to imagine 
courts’ restricting the government to the point where plea bargaining 
 
23Even if the prosecutor’s payments were undisclosed, the prosecutor might decline 
to pay much in order to preserve the office budget for other cases. 
24 It is hard to know whether the majority would prefer to use monetary payments 
if it could do so asymmetrically. From its perspective, a disadvantage of plea 
bargaining is that it might give its agent, the prosecutor, too much discretion. 
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with witnesses disappears, though there is no evidence of such a 
trend.25 Courts can justify the asymmetry by promising transparency, 
and with the argument that it is more than offset by other 
asymmetries that favor the defendant. 
A third explanation focuses on the disclosure of witness 
compensation to juries and adversaries. We have already mentioned 
that the ban on payments reflects the concern that payments will be 
made but not disclosed. Juries and adversaries will be unable to 
assess the strength of testimony without this information. As a repeat 
player, however, the government is perhaps more reliably held to its 
disclosure obligations. It is plausible that most of the benefits traded 
by the government in order to gain testimony, including improved 
terms of confinement and agreements not to prosecute, are more 
observable than cash.26 On the other hand, a promise to prosecute on 
some charges and not others—and a failure to disclose such a 
bargain—will sometimes be more difficult to observe. More 
generally, a prosecutor who wants to secret his inducements can hide 
behind his discretionary power to prosecute or not; even witnesses 
already in confinement can be rewarded by parole boards for their 
good behavior in ways not fully transparent to defendants against 
whom these parolees testified.27 
A more interesting twist, and fourth understanding, is that the 
asymmetry in favor of the government might offset a subtle one that 
favors many defendants. There are cases where the problem is not 
that witnesses do not know they are needed, and cannot be 
compelled, but rather where self-interest or other loyalties keep them 
 
25 This asymmetry led to the controversial case, United States v. Singleton, 144 
F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), in which the court held prosecutorial plea bargains 
impermissible under the federal anti-bribery statute, 18 USC §201(c)(2). On 
rehearing, the court reversed its decision en banc, see United States v. Singleton, 
165 F3d 1297 (1999), on the basis that 18 USC §201(c)(2) does not apply to agents 
acting as alter egos of the United States government. Much of the subsequent 
literature has focused on the unreliability of testimony obtained through plea 
bargains and the resulting disadvantage to the defendant. See, for 
example, Timothy Hollis, An Offer you Can’t Refuse? United States v. Singleton 
and the Effects of Witness/Prosecutorial Agreements, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J (2000). 
Proposed solutions range from increasing the transparency of plea bargains, so that 
juries can better evaluate the reliability of the testimony, to more aggressive calls 
to prohibit plea bargains due to the asymmetrical power it creates. See Michael 
Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of 
Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129 (2004); James W. Haldin, Note, 
Toward a Level Playing Field: Challenges to Accomplice Testimony in the Wake of 
United States v. Singleton, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515 (2000). In spite of this 
controversy, plea bargains remain common practice throughout the United States, 
not to mention the world.  
26 To be sure, prosecutors can offer benefits, including monetary ones, and attempt 
to hide these from the court. See In re G. Paul Howes, (D.C. C.A. 2012)(use of 
vouchers as substitute for illicit cash payments). 
27 Another asymmetrical problem with disclosure is noted infra note 48.  
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away. In cases ranging from everyday tax fraud to large-scale 
criminal enterprises, employees might decline to come forward 
because their salaries or other compensation depends on the 
continued viability of the very employers who are the targets of 
criminal prosecution. In some cases the payments will seem close to 
explicit, as when a defendant’s associate is promoted or favored with 
a profitable contract on the heels of an acquittal or in circumstances 
where the government’s prosecutorial effort was thwarted. In other 
cases, there is simply an ongoing arrangement of sorts and the parties 
are bound by mutual self-interest or, more romantically, by notions 
of loyalty to clan and a cultural norm against “ratting.”28 The 
government is of course free to argue in court that testimony is 
tainted or unavailable to it because of such strong ties, but the right 
ties of this kind can stand in the way of many criminal cases. For 
every trial where the government succeeds because juries are swayed 
and impressed by witnesses who are willing to turn on their 
employers (or families and neighbors), there must be many more 
where some combination of loyalty and self-interest disadvantages 
the government. Put differently, it is easy to imagine witnesses’ lying 
or remaining silent in support of those whom they know, but it is 
much harder to think of cases where citizens will fabricate or remain 
silent in order to further a case made by their government.29 Loyalty 
to one’s government, or larger community, rarely involves false 
testimony or silence in domestic courts. 
This fact, if it can be called that, would be the basis of a 
powerful if not more obvious positive theory if the government could 
bargain with nonmonetary inducements only when dealing with 
witnesses currently themselves in confinement or called to testify 
against their employers or family members. It would be especially 
easy to spin a story in which the carrots and sticks found inside 
prison walls required the government to be equipped with some 
means of payment that leveled the playing field and made it possible 
to gain truthful testimony from persons in prisons. As it is, the 
explanation is more intuitive than rigorous. The version of this fourth 
explanation that works best might begin with the idea that the 
apparent asymmetry offsets the widespread taboo against providing 
information that harms one’s close associates or peers. It continues 
with the argument that the rule serves, albeit overinclusively, to 
compensate fact witnesses who can expect to lose money or position 
when they testify in a way likely to harm their employers or 
 
28 This norm might itself have an efficiency explanation, though it might be a blunt 
instrument that is refined by the rules discussed here. See Saul Levmore, 
Informants, Barn Burning, and the Public Interest: Loyalty in Law, Literature, and 
Manly Endeavors (2012 conference paper available from author).  
29 These cases might be limited to those where witnesses are eager to see an enemy 
convicted. 
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comparable parties. This explanation, like the others before it, 
requires an additional step in order to explain why the offset cannot 
be in the form of cash. The government could, after all, be allowed to 
pay for an employee’s testimony against his employer, subject 
perhaps to a disclosure requirement and a court’s approval of the 
payment. Again, the argument must be that once monetary payments 
were allowed to one side, they would be allowed to the other and 
justice would not be served—or the majority’s interests not 
advanced. 
 
II. PAYMENTS FOR EVIDENCE PRODUCTION 
A. Ex Ante and Ex Post Payments 
There is no asymmetry in the government’s favor as one moves 
back in time and away from particular testimony. Either side can 
offer a reward for information leading to the arrest of a perpetrator or 
for the return of a lost object.30 And, plainly, a storekeeper is free to 
pay a security guard, much as the government is expected to pay its 
police officers, even though the employee is likely to be called upon 
to testify at some later trial—albeit one that is unlikely to find the 
storekeeper in the role of defendant. No court would bar the later 
testimony against a shoplifter simply because the witness had been 
paid in advance by the victimized storekeeper. It is not simply that 
the employer had non-testimonial aims. For example, a criminal 
suspect can pay a lawyer or other person to be present when the 
police conduct a search, though that person might later be called as a 
witness. Similarly, a civil rights worker or a candidate for political 
office can pay someone to be an observer, though it is plain that if 
testimony is later required, it will almost surely be given “in a certain 
way.” Great latitude is afforded payments promised in advance of an 
unfolded story, so long as not conditioned on particular testimony, 
while ex post money payments are severely constrained.31 Witnesses 
 
30 There does not appear to be any law preventing testimony at trial where the 
testimony would not have been available had there not been a much earlier reward. 
Nor does there seem to be law about inducements offered closer to the time of 
testimony. If in the midst of trial one side posted a reward for an alibi witness or a 
missing weapon, it is unclear whether current rules would sanction the payment, 
the offer, or the resulting evidence. 
31 It is clear that ex ante payments are more acceptable than ex post payments. The 
observer might be paid in advance but might not easily be solicited after the fact. 
On the other hand, it is doubtful that testimony would be accepted from a witness 
who had been told one year earlier “I promise to pay you $1,000 if during this next 
year you testify for me in a trial in which I seek damages for a tort.” That offer is 
ex ante but overly conditioned and particular even though the alleged tort has not 
yet taken place. Note that the example pertains to a civil dispute, where the rule 
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of this kind might lose their jobs if their employers find them 
uncooperative when the times comes to testify, but it is likely that the 
pressure to give untrue testimony is reduced when the compensation 
is set in advance and not tied to particular testimony. For this reason, 
and simply because efficient employment contracts may be 
encouraged at the margin by the possibility that the employee will 
“work” as a witness, ex ante investments in future witnesses are 
welcome. 
The government’s hiring of police officers is comfortably 
included in the preceding analysis, but the reasoning does not extend 
to informants. More generally, ex ante arrangements are not 
necessarily superior to ex post payments for testimony. The police 
might pay a well-placed source to call a contact on the police force 
when a person of interest arrives at a location, but that information 
triggers police action rather than forms the core of useful testimony. 
“Follow E around and we will pay you $500 if and when you able to 
tell us and, if necessary, testify that you saw E sell drugs,” comes 
closer to prohibited inducement, and is certainly so if the payment is 
not for the surveillance information but for the actual testimony. 
Indeed, it seems more likely that such an offer would induce false 
testimony or encourage more crime than one structured as: “We 
suspect E of selling drugs last week; we will pay you $500 if you are 
able to testify that you observed such a transaction.” The same is 
likely true for nonmonetary payments, if monetary inducements are 
to be ruled out because they cannot be permitted the defense, and 
because such blatant asymmetry would run afoul of court-generated 
constitutional protections. An offer made to an inmate, F, that: “If a 
guard is ever attacked in this prison, we will reduce your prison 
sentence if you tell us who did it, and you testify accordingly,” seems 
quite capable of generating false testimony and dangerously likely to 
increase the number of attacks on guards. It is probably worse than 
the more ex post: “We will reduce your sentence if you testify that 
last week’s attack on Guard X was undertaken by Y,” or: “We will 
reduce your sentence if you identify the person who attacked X last 
week.”  
There are, to be sure, many variations on this theme, and it 
seems unlikely that we can reach many firm conclusions about the 
relative desirability of ex ante and ex post promises and payments 
 
against payments also applies. 
It is tempting to advance the idea that payment is more acceptable when it is part 
of a package in which the potential witness is assigned other tasks along with the 
possibility that he will one day offer testimony. A police officer, as well as the 
civil rights intern, does more than wait around to be a witness, and this somehow 
makes the payment less objectionable. There are situations where the bundling is 
more efficient, but there are also contexts where specialization is efficient, and we 
hesitate to place too much weight on this feature of some ex ante payments. 
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with respect to testimony. In any event, there are two good reasons 
not to bind the permissibility of payments for testimony to the timing 
of inducements. The first is that timing does not matter if we assume 
hyper-rationality. In the prison case, for example, the strategic 
inmate, F, might behave identically whether the government’s offer 
is ex ante or ex post, because F will anticipate the ex post offer. If 
this putative witness knows that the government will likely offer a 
reduction in time served or other benefit to find the person who 
attacked a guard, it matters not whether the government waits to 
make the offer or posts it long in advance of any attack. Second, the 
benefit of an ex ante offer seems to be that it avoids making payment 
for specific testimony “given in a certain way.” But it is plausible 
that there is a greater moral hazard when the payment is for uncertain 
testimony than when it is for testimony about a particular wrongdoer 
or specific victim. There is, after all, more opportunity for an 
opportunistic witness to bring about an attack on some guard or by 
some inmate than there is the chance of generating an attack on a 
named guard or by a named inmate. It is likely that specificity 
generates bias, inasmuch as the government can pay but the 
defendant cannot, but generality increases moral hazard. We ought 
not, therefore, make a broad claim about what the law prefers or 
ought to prefer with respect to the timing of inducements, at least 
with respect to testimony.  
Where physical evidence is concerned, ex ante payments come 
with the advantage of limiting defendants’ ability to sort and 
misrepresent evidence. Consider a case where a defendant proffers a 
photograph as evidence. The defense might have sorted through 
many images from one source and selected the one most favorable to 
it, even if it is most misleading. Arguably, the defense need not turn 
over the other images because it is does not intend to use them at 
trial.32 If law wanted to limit misleading evidence, it is not obvious 
what remedy it could use to force full disclosure regarding the set 
from which defendant selected evidence, but we might understand a 
preference for advance payments as pushing in the right direction. 
Thus, if the photographs available to the defendant came from a 
camera installed at the government’s behest in a public place, then 
 
32 Fed. R. Crim. P (16)(b)(1)(A) (requiring disclosure by defendant if defendant 
has used Rule 16 to gain information from the government and the defendant has 
an “item . . . within the defendant's possession, custody, or control; and . . . intends 
to use the item in the defendant's case-in-chief at trial). 
Note that the government, asymmetrically, does not enjoy this ability to sort and 
select evidence. Fed. R. Crim. P. (16)(a)(1)(E) requires the government to turn 
over material under its control if it is material to preparing the defense—or if it 
intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial or the item was obtained from or 
belongs to the defendant. The government would clearly need to turn over all the 
photographs. The asymmetry is not on its own puzzling inasmuch as it is but one 
of many in favor of the accused. 
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the defendant’s sort-and-select strategy could be undone by the 
prosecutor’s ability to look at the other (now relevant) photographs 
produced by this camera and others near it.33  
  
B. Regulated Payments for Physical Evidence 
1. The Need for Greater Rewards 
As a doctrinal matter, physical evidence differs from testimonial 
evidence because there is no blanket prohibition on payment for 
particular evidence. Physical evidence—and here we refer both to 
objects (such as weapons, diaries, and automobiles) and to data 
(including DNA, recordings, and the contents of a computer’s hard 
drive)—can surely be fabricated, but apparently the intuition is that 
critical evidence subject to a chain of control, or otherwise tested, is 
less corruptible than are fact witnesses.34 Most physical evidence will 
be compelled by subpoena or will otherwise be in the possession of 
the police. The point of payment must be to bring forward evidence 
that will otherwise be secreted or in the hands of an owner who is 
unaware of its relevance, or that will not be produced in the first 
place if uncompensated.35 
We have seen that all payments need to be inspected for moral 
hazard. If there is no problem of this kind, then an advance offer for 
information that later turns out to be relevant evidence is usually 
unproblematic, while an ex post payment for information already 
known to be favorable to one side in a particular case is only 
attractive where it does not generate holdouts or renegotiations. The 
 
33 Put differently, the more the government has paid for, and has access to, all 
available data, the less the defendant can sort-and-select. 
34 The distinction between physical and testimonial evidence, and the nature of 
fabrication, collapses at the margin. For example, the value of a DNA sample or 
audio recording may completely depend on when and where it was taken, so that 
the physical evidence depends on testimony about its origin. There is also the case 
where we have only a recording of a potential witness’s words. We try, therefore, 
not to put too much weight on the categorical distinction, but rather to paint with a 
broad brush. On the other hand, we do suggest a change in practice regarding 
physical evidence and not testimony, but the call is really for a change where the 
risk of fabrication is low. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. To make the 
categories yet murkier, when we advance the idea of investing in physical 
evidence, we include and even emphasize the personal efforts that go into the 
production of such evidence (infra note 39 and accompanying text), so that the 
distinction is not between things and people. 
35 The idea that some information, or evidence, happens along while other 
information requires inducement brings to mind the distinction between 
information that one party to a contract knows in the course of things and 
information that requires legal protection if it is to be developed. See Anthony T. 
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 9-18 (1978). 
20 122 YALE LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming 2012)  
 
government can be expected to take this into account when making 
payments, and a good way to understand subpoenas and other means 
of compulsion is as a way of protecting against the holdout and 
renegotiation problem. A person who knows that she controls critical 
evidence cannot easily hold out, because once she tries to profit from 
its existence the state is entitled (on behalf of either party) to compel 
its production with no reward. Of course, the missing element here is 
that this power may lead to the underproduction of evidence in the 
first place. 
Our suggestion that evidence is likely underproduced, and in 
need of new inducements, is tied to the reality of technological 
change. For most of history, law may simply have reflected the view 
that witnesses and physical evidence happen along, and can be 
compelled when necessary. One way to think about professional 
police is that increased wealth or improved mobility, or both, made it 
worthwhile to make ex ante payments to civil servants whose job 
description would include protecting, investigating, and witnessing. 
With the development of a connected and wireless world, it is 
plausible that law is ready for another change because there are more 
opportunities for investment in evidence-gathering devices like 
cameras and smartphones. New technologies motivate our thinking 
about explicit payments for the production of evidence. At the same 
time, law may also be ready for enhanced protections of privacy. For 
every technology that might be encouraged to produce evidence, 
there is the objection or danger that citizens (or the spirit of the 
Constitution) would actually prefer to suppress the new intrusions 
rather than encourage them. We offer no opinion on this matter, but 
proceed as if there were agreement simply to fight crime efficiently, 
without regard to privacy and related issues. Put more optimistically, 
fixed cameras, smartphones, and motivated human witnesses have 
the potential to bring about dramatic reductions in police forces, and 
constitutional values might be furthered by this reduction and by the 
likelihood that machines are free of some of the biases that we 
associate with humans, and especially with those paid to fight crime. 
The next step could be to deploy takings law more aggressively 
when it comes to compelled evidence.36 We regard this approach as 
 
36 Courts have typically denied compensation for physical evidence under the 
takings clause since the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurtado v. United States, 410 
U.S. 578 (1973). In Hurtado, the Court held that the government’s compulsion of a 
person’s time and labor for the draft, jury duty, or witness appearances is not a 
constitutional taking because these are civic duties—as opposed to property taken 
by the government. Lower federal courts and state courts extrapolated Hurtado, 
holding that the takings clause does not apply to physical evidence acquired by the 
government through subpoenas. See Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, Taking 
Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1081, 1083-84 
(1999) (explaining the expansion of the Hurtado holding to physical evidence in 
lower courts). Even if subpoenas for physical evidence were considered 
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inadequate, in large part because even the most liberal form of 
takings law fails to capture a great deal of information as well as 
objects that are not in the control of “owners.”37 We begin with an 
example that does not implicate new technology and then move to 
one that does—with broad consequences. Imagine, first, that there 
has been a fatal shooting but that no gun has been located, and that 
the gun would likely lead to the conviction (or acquittal) of G. We 
know that the police will search for the weapon, but it might be that 
private citizens are better at searching or that some citizen, H, has 
seen a gun but is disinclined to come forward or does not realize that 
it is linked to a homicide. H requires motivation, but H has never 
owned this property and will not be compensated by takings law, 
except with some stretch of an argument that first labels H the finder 
of the property, and then regards the prior owner as relinquishing a 
claim, when often that fiction will be contradicted by facts. As 
positive theorists, it is easy to explain law’s disinclination to 
encourage H with money; compensation might lead to fabrication 
(though this is difficult in the case of guns),38 to false testimony 
 
government takings, some argue that just compensation is provided by “implicit in-
kind compensation.” See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 195-215 (1985). Under this theory, the 
government’s use of evidence is compensated by the opportunity of the property 
owner to compel production of evidence if the need arises in the future.  
Lawson and Seidman argue that the application of Hurtado to physical evidence 
and implicit in-kind compensation are insufficient justifications to deny 
compensation under the takings clause. In particular, they argue that unlike witness 
testimony, subpoenaed physical evidence falls within the takings clause under an 
originalist interpretation of the Constitution. They further argue that although 
implicit in-kind compensation is justifiable in “normal cases,” there are three 
exceptional situations in which further compensation may be required: (1) “where 
the target [of the subpoena] can realistically expect significant asymmetries in the 
application of the scheme,” (2) “where compliance costs are unusually high 
because the scope of the demand is unusually large or complex,” and (3) “where 
the act of production itself has costs beyond ordinary compliance costs.” Lawson 
& Seidman, id., at 1107-11. 
37 In principle, takings law could do the job. When a court compels evidence, the 
owner ought to be compensated for the transfer, or rental, of the evidence at a level 
that is calculated to encourage rather than discourage production. This is more or 
less the compensation expected in takings law, where we do not want property 
owners to shy away from building and owning factories, for example, in the 
expectation that these properties might be taken for a war effort or highway. The 
government can bargain for a factory or its output, or take it and pay an amount 
equal to the pre-episode value to the property owner, but well below the value to 
the government. In the case of physical evidence this standard can be a bit 
complicated because the government or defendant might want the evidence for a 
short period of time (where, correspondingly, real property might well be regarded 
as not entirely taken), and thus not compensated, and some authority will need to 
be sensitive to the danger that low or zero compensation will have an unfortunate 
effect on the production of evidence in the first place. 
38 Note that when physical evidence is easier to fabricate, as might be the case for 
simple documents, we can rely on judges to find the evidence inadmissible. The 
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about the event itself or the location of the weapon, to unnecessary 
costs because evidence might be withheld when otherwise it would 
be compelled, and to a disconcerting advantage for rich defendants. 
Still, our normative intuition is that the current nearly-all-or-nothing 
rule, fashioned perhaps in the wake of takings law, goes too far and 
misses opportunities to extract critical evidence, with little risk of 
miscarrying justice. 
Consider next a case where J records on his iPhone a video that 
one side will find extremely useful in a criminal trial. J need not be 
paid the $100,000 that the evidence might be worth to the interested 
party (and there is the danger that such payments will bias things in 
favor of well-endowed defendants), but J needs be paid enough to 
make it likely that people will switch on their smartphones when 
they are likely to record useful evidence. We might have said that 
compensation needs to be sufficient so as not to discourage people 
from buying smartphones in the first place, inasmuch as they can be 
taken (for a considerable period of time) by the government in this 
hypothetical, but the expected value of that loss seems too low to 
change many purchase decisions. Whether or not this is so, the 
amount of compensation needed to ensure that smartphones are 
bought as before and then turned on (or at least not intentionally 
turned off) so as to record critical events seems fairly low. To be 
sure, smartphones might be discouraged by the danger that a criminal 
will injure the owner of an operating smartphone in order to destroy 
the means of his conviction. More substantial payment might be 
needed to overcome this fear, but that is easily done. Similarly, if 
private surveillance cameras are not as ubiquitous as the courts or 
other regulators would like, then more compensation might be 
awarded for useful footage in order to encourage the purchase and 
installation of these devices. Takings law can be understood as 
preventing “singling out” by the government, while the task here is 
to regulate—or generate—the market for evidence production.39 
 2. One Step Forward 
It is unlikely that the law of evidence or the rules of criminal 
procedure need to be changed, because little stops the parties from 
paying for physical evidence, whether ex ante or ex post, at present. 
The problem is that while the power to compel evidence combats the 
holdout problem, it likely discourages optimal investment in 
 
distinction is thus not precisely between testimonial and physical evidence, but 
between properly admissible testimony and physical evidence. 
39 This is in contrast to the proposition advanced by Lawson & Seidman, supra 
note 36, which does not focus on generating and encouraging evidence production, 
but rather on the potential violation of the takings clause in situations where the 
evidence is of unusually high value or is excessively burdensome to produce.  
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evidence production. We have in mind a budget that allows judges to 
compensate the owners of physical evidence. An owner or finder 
who comes forward with the weapon needed to advance a murder 
trial, for example, should expect it to be tested for the danger of 
fabrication, but should also expect to be paid by the court if it proves 
true.  
Other arms of the state might do more in the way of ex ante 
payments. Private parties can be paid to install cameras and to turn 
their smartphones into tools of evidence production, and thus crime-
prevention. Our intuition is that the most successful schemes will pay 
the producers of physical evidence for results rather than mere 
efforts, perhaps adding in occasional large rewards. The first part of 
this intuition follows from some confidence about the system’s 
ability to detect fabrication, and the second part is a reaction to the 
expectation that the payments for physical evidence are likely to be 
low. This is true whether one is guided by consideration of optimal 
evidence production or by the realities of budgets, and what we can 
expect of courts or other authorities. We imagine, for instance, a 
scheme in which smartphone users are rewarded with a 30-cent a day 
reduction in phone bill charges in return for loading and leaving alive 
(for at least some number of hours per day) an “app” that records 
local sound or video information and sends it to a storage location for 
some period of time. This is likely to work best if the information is 
in the hands of a third party, or even several such parties which 
compete to show consumers that they respect privacy and unlock the 
information only when it is sought by a court or relevant to a 
criminal case.40 The prospect of a cost reduction of $100 per year, for 
each participant, might motivate the production of evidence—
without creating a moral hazard—and also be worthwhile from a 
crime-fighting point of view. But it is easy to imagine a news story 
about a criminal violently extracting smartphones prior to a planned 
crime or about a smartphone user arrested on the basis of evidence 
received from her own phone, causing a large fraction of participants 
to disable the app, at the cost of the 30-cent per-diem. The way to 
combat this volatility, or quirk in human reasoning, is apt to be with 
another teaser, such as lottery proceeds or a prize for a provider of 
evidence. Smartphone owners will then enable the evidence-
gathering app in the hope of gaining a sizeable reward.  
The case for these payments is strengthened or at least informed 
by admiralty law’s strategy with respect to salvage. Salvors are 
compensated after the fact, and in proportion to the risk, equipment, 
and success associated with the episode. The legal rule tries to create 
the right incentive for investment in salvage equipment, and then for 
 
40 Note that this information can be retrieved in a way that limits the ability of a 
party to sort-and-select. See __.  
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the effort suitable to a given emergency.41 The most important 
difference between salvors and producers of physical evidence is that 
shippers in need of rescue (and courts) have no power to compel 
salvors (for if they did, there would be underinvestment in salvage). 
But the similarities are significant, especially where we think that 
evidence does not happen along but is rather the product of effort.42 
C. Regulated Payments for Testimony—Rejected 
Where witnesses come forward, it is more difficult to use 
scientific techniques to establish authenticity. Inducements might 
well be needed for witnesses who do not just happen along,43 or who 
run risks by coming forward, but payments to them create the risk of 
bias, likely destabilize ex ante contracts, and even create moral 
hazards. If K is the sort of person who might go outside on a dark 
night to monitor a parking lot in the hope of compensation, it is 
perhaps too likely that K will allow a crime to occur, and be a 
witness to it, rather than prevent it or call police who might serve as 
uncompensated witnesses. In extreme cases, K might even encourage 
the commission of a crime in order to profit from witnessing it. The 
most plausible cases for compensation are probably those presently 
associated with witness protection programs, but there will also be 
cases where payment can overcome the inhibition and financial loss 
suffered by one who testifies against an employer or fellow worker. 
The government’s ability to provide nonmonetary benefits is rarely 
of use in these contexts, but whistleblower rewards do occasionally 
rise to the occasion. We have seen that the Internal Revenue Code 
offers sizeable rewards for information leading to the collection of 
very large tax liabilities.44 No doubt, law could expand on and refine 
that impulse where other testimony is concerned. Payments could be 
set after the fact and tied to the risk and investment undertaken by 
the witness, or set by formula, published in advance in the manner of 
tax law. If payments are made, they should be symmetrically 
available to witnesses for the defense, for they too might run risks.  
 
41 On the law of salvage and its promotion of optimum rescue efforts, see William 
M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other 
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 100-05 
(1978). 
42 Note that admiralty law can also be seen as sensitive to the holdout problem we 
have discussed. In the middle of an emergency, a local rescue vessel will enjoy 
holdout power, and overcompensation will lead to over-entry and over-investment 
in ex ante contracts with potential salvors. Admiralty law’s solution has been with 
us for many hundreds of years; contracts made under stress are unenforced, and the 
ex-post compensation is generous. 
43 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (linking the discussion to Kronman’s 
distinction in contract law between information acquired in the course of things 
and information acquired through costly investment). 
44 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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But we do not favor radical changes in the rules barring 
payments to witnesses. There is, first of all, little technological 
change in this domain. More important, we have advanced a variety 
of new explanations for the various asymmetries and constraints in 
present law, and most of these warn against direct payments. The 
comparison with admiralty law is again instructive, and the 
difference between witness and salvor is much greater than that 
between salvor and a producer of physical evidence. Payments to 
fact witnesses generate a significant moral hazard, a risk of 
fabrication, and a danger of destabilizing earlier contracts with 
employees.45 None of these problems is present in the case of 
salvage, and none is serious where payment for physical evidence is 
proposed. 
Another difference between payments for witness testimony and 
for physical evidence (as well as salvage) is that the former presents 
a serious price-setting problem. It is difficult for an outsider to know 
much about the risk a witness runs, the value of a personal 
relationship that will be destroyed by perceived betrayal and, most of 
all, the effort invested. All these things are easier in the case of 
physical evidence. In addition, we can observe the effect of 
compensation on such things as the installation of surveillance 
cameras46—and, once installed, their content can be compelled or 
simply streamed—but it is much harder to observe the impact of 
compensation on the willingness of people to observe rather than to 
turn away, and then to come forward rather than to slink away.  
There are other problems with payments for testimony. Jurors 
probably need to be told about payments, and they might draw the 
wrong conclusions from this information.47 Payments offered to a 
large group are likely to appeal to the biggest liars in the group, and 
it is difficult for juries to correct for this effect or for law always to 
target offers to small groups.48 These problems are not so great as to 
 
45 Nevertheless, payments to employee-witnesses might be useful. It is easy to 
imagine an employee who will not betray a boss unless compensated for his (the 
employee’s) testimony. At the same time, it is just as easy to imagine an unhappy 
worker who would manufacture evidence against his employer in order to be paid 
to leave the job he abhors. 
46 We do not claim that it will be easy to determine the optimal investment in crime 
reduction. Presumably, sophisticated comparisons of several jurisdictions will 
yield information about the returns from these investments, and then preferences 
about privacy will be added in to a jurisdiction’s decision.  
47 If the jury learns that the government has paid handsomely for testimony from L, 
it might think that the police or prosecutor knows that the defendant is a danger to 
society, and that the state is therefore willing to pay a high price in order to put the 
defendant behind bars. In contrast, if the defendant pays a witness well, the jury 
might reason that the defendant believes he or she will otherwise be found guilty—
because the defendant is guilty.  
48 If one side seeks an alibi witness and advertises that payment will be made to a 
witness who saw the defendant in Los Angeles on a certain date, it is effectively 
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“explain” the familiar ban on payments, but we do not explore them 
further inasmuch as we propose no dramatic change with respect to 
payments for testimony.  
CONCLUSION 
We have undertaken two separate, but related, tasks in this 
Article, with respect to the law surrounding incentives for providing 
testimonial and physical evidence. The first is to identify and make 
sense of the various asymmetries in the law, beginning with the 
remarkable ability of the prosecutor to plea bargain for testimony 
even as a defendant is barred from making any significant payments. 
This turns out to be part of a larger picture with other asymmetries, 
including one between ex ante and ex post payments.  
Even as we have developed novel and arguably successful 
arguments explaining current law and its asymmetries, we turned to 
the possibility that new technologies have changed the balance a bit, 
and that it is time to experiment with incentives for the production of 
evidence. Our second task, then, has been to show how such 
incentives might be justified and structured. We have argued on the 
basis of theory and intuition that there is a good case to be made for 
payments for the production of physical evidence, including access 
to data, but that it is too risky to permit payments for testimony 
where such inducements are currently barred.  
A great many things have been left incomplete or even 
untouched. We noted but put to the side the privacy issues that 
become more important when surveillance and other forms of 
evidence production are encouraged. With this important issue 
sidelined, there is no point in developing a more precise proposal for 
payments for the production of evidence. We have simply suggested 
what such a system might look like and why it might be sensible. 
Another looming question is the relevance of the analysis to 
civil trials. In some ways the questions are less interesting where 
 
making an offer to a large group of “sellers,” where there is likely to be at least one 
crafty opportunist. “We offer $3,000 to the woman with red hair who can show 
that she was in Box 107 at a Los Angeles Dodgers baseball game on June 3rd,” 
might be a better way of producing an important witness and not just a good liar, 
but it would be difficult for courts to supervise this process or to explain the 
probabilities to juries.  
Courts might also prefer evidence that is not entirely managed by its producer, but 
again this is difficult to legislate or supervise. “I did not personally see the murder, 
but pay me and I will tell you the name of the waiter who saw it,” seems better 
than: “Pay me and I will tell you who murdered Jack.” It is not much better, 
because the paid informer and the waiter can collude, and there remains a moral 
hazard. “We have reason to think that you saw the waiter run out of the restaurant 
on Monday, and we want the name of that waiter” is yet better, because it targets 
the informer and lessens the possibility that the payment will simply encourage the 
biggest liar in the group.  
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civil litigation is concerned, because there is no plea bargaining in 
the picture, often no repeat player on one side, and probably few 
cases where physical evidence rather than testimony is critical to the 
result. On the other hand, the law is more likely to allow experiments 
with payments where a defendant’s liberty is not at stake or, perhaps, 
where the adversaries agree to permit payments. We leave these 
questions for another effort.  
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